this essay analyzes Vladimir Jankélévitch’s work on death pointing out, in the vast thought of the twentieth century, its original and sharply problematic contribution. if death is generally seen as the perimeter that provides life with sense and autenticity (Heidegger, Lévinas), or more traditionally as the threshold that leads to a salvific other world, Jankélévitch first of all dismantles any reassuring strategy and underlines the elusiveness of death itself, its constituting a “totally other order” that escapes every human category. As (...) a consequence, if on the one hand the philosopher shows how every life has an “own death” that makes every life totally unique, on the other hand he highlights how the elusiveness of death delivers life, any life, to an unavoidable impropriety, which breaks through its individual and personal dimension. (shrink)

La disolución de la noción de sujeto, que atraviesa el siglo XX, ampliamente conseguida hoy, ha hecho necesario, para una parte del pensamiento contemporáneo, impulsar la interrogación reconstructiva hasta su dispositivo preformativo originario: la persona. Merleau-Ponty se sitúa con pleno derecho en este espacio teórico, elaborando una reflexión que, superando tal noción, desplaza la mirada hacia el nivel impersonal y anónima, infra-corporal y pre-individual, más acá de la persona, al cual ésta permanece indisolublemente vinculada. Una reflexión que, por lo tanto, (...) rompiendo al mismo tiempo los bordes del perímetro fenomenológico, no sólo corta de raíz las categorías tradicionales de «yo» e «individuo», de «cuerpo propio» y «subjetividad constituyente», sino que implica una apertura a una nueva antropología y a preguntas tan urgentes como penetrantes a propósito de los derechos humanos.  . (shrink)

Hanno ancora qualcosa da dirci Sartre e Merleau-Ponty oggi? Sessant’anni dopo i loro “contraccolpi” – consumatisi nella redazione di una rivista come “Les Temps Modernes” – vale ancora la pena di ripercorrere quella storia? È questa la domanda che apre l’ultimo numero di “aut aut” curato da Enrica Lisciani-Petrini e Raoul Kirchmayr. Si tratta di una domanda a cui è difficile rispondere e che ha a che fare con che cos’è la filosofia e – soprattutto – che (...) cos’è un filosofo. È una domanda che, nel caso di Sartre e di Merleau-Ponty, non chiama in causa soltanto due differenti scuole di pensiero, ma anche due modi differenti di intendere il mondo, la politica, gli altri e le relazioni con essi. Ma si tratta, in fondo, di una domanda che – con le parole di Sartre – ci porta a riflettere sul fatto che “si è filosofi quando si è morti”, poiché – in fondo – “fino a quando viviamo, siamo uomini che, tra l’altro, scrivono opere di filosofia”. E allora la risposta a quella domanda non può che essere affermativa: il loro “dissidio produttivo” è un atto vitale, un incontro-scontro necessario fra persone che fanno vivere la filosofia.Sartre et Merleau-Ponty ont-ils encore quelque chose à nous dire aujourd’hui? Soixante années après leurs « contrecoups » – qui ont eu lieu dans la rédaction de la revue Les Temps Modernes – vaut-il encore la peine de reparcourir cette histoire? Voilà la question qui ouvre le dernier numéro de la revue « aut aut », sous la direction d’Enrica Lisciani-Petrini et Raoul Kirchmayr. Il s’agit d’une question à laquelle il est difficile de répondre et qui est en rapport avec ce qu’est la philosophie et – surtout – avec ce qu’est un philosophe. Il s’agit d’une question qui, chez Sartre et Merleau-Ponty, ne met pas seulement en cause deux courants de pensée différents, mais aussi deux différentes manières de concevoir le monde, la politique, les autres et les relations qu’on entretient avec eux. Mais il s’agit, au fond, d’une question qui – en employant les mots de Sartre – nous conduit à réfléchir sur le fait que « l’on est philosophes quand on est morts », parce que – après tout – « jusqu’à ce que nous vivons, nous sommes des hommes qui, entre autre, écrivent des oeuvres de philosophie ». Alors la réponse à cette question ne peut être qu’affirmative : leur « différend productif » est un acte vital, en même temps une rencontre et un affrontement nécessaires entre des personnes qui font vivre la philosophie.Do Sartre and Merleau-Ponty still have something to say to us today? Sixty years after their “breakup” – which took place in editing the journal Les Temps Modernes – is it still worthwhile to go over this history? This is the question that opens the last issue of the journal “aut aut,” under the direction of Enrica Lisciani-Petrini and Raoul Kirchmayr. It is a question to which it is difficult to respond and bears on what philosophy is – and especially with what a philosopher is today. It is a matter which, according to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, does not only call into question two different currents of thought, but also two different ways of conceiving the world, politics, others and the relations between them. But it is a matter, at its core, which – employing the words of Sartre – leads us to reflect on the fact that “we are philosophers when we are dead,” because – after all – “while we are alive, we are men who, among other things, write works of philosophy.” Thus, the response to this question can only be affirmative: their “productive difference” is a vital act, at the same time an encounter and necessary confrontation between persons who breathe life into philosophy. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the comparison of individual and group decision-making, in a stochastic inter-temporal problem in two decision environments, namely risk and ambiguity. Using a consumption/saving laboratory experiment, we investigate behaviour in four treatments: individual choice under risk; group choice under risk; individual choice under ambiguity and group choice under ambiguity. Comparing decisions within and between decision environments, we find an anti-symmetric pattern. While individuals are choosing on average closer to the theoretical optimal predictions, compared to groups in the (...) risk treatments, groups tend to deviate less under ambiguity. Within decision environments, individuals deviate more when they choose under ambiguity, while groups are better planners under ambiguity rather than under risk. Our results extend the often observed pattern of individuals behaving more optimally under risk, to its dynamic dimension. (shrink)

Goldberg notes that the relationship is a component of Conflicts of Interests. Networks of relationships and the simultaneous presence of several interests are not negative per se but become so when they generate a conflict that undermines impartiality. The solution to the problem of COIs, therefore, cannot be to abolish relationships and the interests that they necessarily express but rather to verify whether those relationships are such as to unduly affect an individual’s judgement. The evolution of an Italian legislation about (...) COIs is eloquent in this regard. (shrink)

The present narrative review addresses issues concerning the defining criteria and conceptual underpinnings of pain catastrophizing. To date, the concept of pain catastrophizing has been extensively used in many clinical and experimental contexts and it is considered as one of the most important psychological correlate of pain chronicity and disability. Although its extensive use, we are still facing important problems related to its defining criteria and conceptual understanding. At present, there is no general theoretical agreement of what catastrophizing really is. (...) The lack of a consensus on its definition and conceptual issues has important consequences on the choice of the pain management approaches, defining and identifying problems, and promoting novel research. Clinical and research work in absence of a common theoretical ground is often trivial. It is very surprising that clinical and experimental work has grown extensively in the past years, without a common ground in the form of a clear definition of pain catastrophizing and overview of its conceptual basis. Improving the efficacy and efficiency of pan catastrophizing related treatments requires an understanding of the theoretical construct. So far, most interventions have only demonstrated modest effects in reducing pain catastrophizing. Therefore, clarifying the construct may be an important precursor for developing more targeted and effective interventions, thereby easing some of the burden related to this aspect of pain. In our review, we have extracted and de-constructed common elements that emerge from different theoretical models with the aim to understand the concept of catastrophizing, which components can be modulated by psychological interventions, and the general role in pain processing. The analysis of the literature has indicated essential key elements to explain pain catastrophizing: emotional regulation, catastrophic worry, rumination, behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation systems, and interoceptive sensitivity. The present paper attempts to integrate these key elements with the aim to re-compose and unify the concept within a modern biopsychosocial interpretation of catastrophizing. (shrink)

After reviewing current opinions about the social function of literature in second-century BCE Rome, I focus on two controversial fragments assigned to Cato the Censor's Origines. In the first, Cato portrays the ancestors in a convivial setting as they sing the praises and the manly deeds of famous men; in the second, he gestures towards the pontifex maximus' specialized use of writing and the functioning of the tabula as a locus of memory. By drawing on the field of performance studies, (...) I identify the performative features inherent in both of these fragments and map out how these features inform the positioning of Cato in relation to the identity politics of his time, professionalism, and writing. The aim of this study is to return the Origines to its immediate socio-cultural purview, but working towards this aim will also entail a shift in perspective and a reassessment of our notions of “poetry” and “prose.” In fact, by stressing the performance dimension that underlies the genesis of the Origines as a text, this article will also expose the shortcomings inherent in the hyper-literary approaches that have been so far adopted. (shrink)

Experiments on intertemporal consumption typically show that people have difficulties in optimally solving such problems. Previous studies have focused on contexts in which agents are faced with risky future incomes and have to plan over long horizons. We present an experiment comparing decision making under certainty, risk, and ambiguity, over a shorter lifecycle. Results show that behavior in the ambiguity treatment is markedly different than in the risk condition and it is characterized by a significant pattern of under-consumption.

This paper aims at thoroughly analyzing the relation between Thucydides’s political realism and Hobbes’s one, first of all by examining the Hobbesian translation of The Peloponnesian War, then by stressing the peculiarities of the political theory of the English philosopher. Compared to Thucydides, Hobbes presents a more complex, problematic – and truly more useful to define a theory of modernity – version of political realism, which considers not only power and security, but also ideological elements in order to understand human (...) conflicts. (shrink)

This article offers a critical view of the process of material constitutionalization of the European citizenship, through an analysis of the transformations of its outer borders in the phase of enlargement. The repositioning and deterritorialization of the inner and outer borders of the EU lead to a decomposition of its judiciary space, which illustrates the way in which borders have become an instrument of governance of Europe’s postcolonial condition. The analysis focuses on the recent legislative transformations introduced in Poland, Romania (...) and Bulgaria in order to adapt their national judicial systems to EU common rules. (shrink)

The article considers the changes that have affected European border regimes of migration control as a testcase for discussing arbitrariness. The argument highlights the limited capacity of notions of arbitrariness defined as a departure from the rule of law to capture the ongoing conflict at the borders of Europe and brings, instead, to the foreground the ambivalent meaning of arbitrariness. By comparing Santi Romano’s classical theory of legal pluralism with recent analyses of legal globalization processes, arbitrariness emerges either as an (...) authoritative attempt to impose a different order on society or as a means to contrast acts of resistance to border regimes. In both cases, arbitrariness forcefully blurs the limits between the ordered and unordered, indicating the paradoxical impossibility of excluding the law’s outside from the legal order. On these premises, the article advocates the importance of reframing the demand for open borders as a call for freedom of those who challenge the pragmatic order of migration regimes. Indeed, arbitrariness is necessarily limited when the legal order recognizes, to an extent, the agency and the claims of subjectivities that resist the dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion. Keywords: migration, arbitrariness, borders, legal order. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to call attention to Dionysius’s kataphatic theology and, in particular, to an aspect which is not commonly discussed: the dissimilarimages applied to God. More precisely, I will focus on the image of the worm, which Dionysius considers the vilest and most dissimilar image applied to the divineThearchy. I will try to show that the worm, with its multiple and contradictory attributes, is indeed the best example for Dionysius’s “absurd theology” of the dissimilar images, since (...) it perfectly fits the complex and paradoxical Dionysian view of the relationship/non-relationship between God and the world. (shrink)